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monotonicity of consumer demand in price for GM products using data collected from a nationally 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the general economic theory of undifferentiated goods, price has a monotonic relationship 
with consumption – consumption decreases as price increases.  When products are differentiated, 
however, price’s monotonic relationship to consumption need no longer hold.  In fact, when product 
quality is highly subjective (e.g., fashion or art), novel (e.g., a new feature), or difficult to verify prior to 
purchase (e.g., credence attributes), consumers may turn to one or more signals, including price, to form 
quality perceptions.  Products containing genetically modified (GM) ingredients meet each of these 
criteria, i.e., GM ingredients are novel, their presence is difficult to verify, and their impact on quality 
may be viewed differently across individuals with the same knowledge.   
Many theoretical models explore whether price or some combination of price and another quality 
signal such as advertising can effectively signal product quality when consumers are not fully informed 
(e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981; Wolinsky, 1983; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) and how the introduction of 
price as a quality signal may impact the shape of consumer demand functions (Pollak, 1977) and alter 
the nature of market equilibrium (Balasko, 2003).  Jones and Hudson (1996) developed a model of the 
price-quality relationship at different price levels and concluded that there is a critical price interval in 
which price is used as a signal of quality.  However, the results of their paper exclude the role of price as 
a signal of quality at lower price level.  They suggest that the price above a critical price is used to signal 
quality while the price below a critical price is not.  
While empirical tests are not as common as theoretical work in this area, several authors have 
explored the predictions of various signaling models by correlating objective quality assessments of 
various consumer goods with price, advertising and other signals of product quality within particular 
markets (Landon and Smith, wine, 1998; Nichols, cars, 1998; Esposto, cigars, 1998) or across several 
markets (e.g., Hjorth-Andersen, 1991; Caves and Greene, 1996).  Caves and Greene (1996) show that   3 
quality-price correlations exist in many markets and that the level of correlation is higher for product 
categories that include more brands and is lower for convenience goods.   
Although all these papers approached the issues differently, they share a common thought in the 
sense that they concluded that price acts as a signal of quality.  However, most of these papers focus on 
the empirical relationship itself rather than the behavioral effects induced from the relationship.  In other 
words, most of these papers analyze the relationship between price and quality rather than individual 
consumer’s purchase decisions induced by particular combinations of price and non-price quality signals.  
For instance, Caves and Greene (1996) analyze the correlations between product quality and price using 
data from Consumer Reports, in which experts rate the quality of various products.  Esposto (1997) 
analyzes the relationship between price and quality by estimating a hedonic equation in which price is 
explained by experts’ product quality ratings.  However, these papers do not analyze consumers’ 
consumption choice as a function of price and non-price quality signals. 
Product quality attributes are highly dependent upon the type of product.  For example, in the 
case of food, it could be taste, nutrition, color, and shape, while in the case of kitchen appliances it could 
be energy efficiency, power and design.  This paper focuses on GM content as an attribute.  
The social and private efficacy of GM technology in food production is an increasingly studied 
issue in food consumption research.  Many studies have examined GM acceptance as a food safety issue 
because, for some people, the perceived safety of GM technology is unresolved.  That is, for some, food 
produced with GM technology indicates low quality.  However, others suggest that the application of 
GM technology in food production could decreases food expenditures, reduce production costs, improve 
food attributes such as nutritional content and limit environmental problems such as agricultural 
chemicals residues (the Institute of Food Science & Technology, 2004).  Baker et al. (2001) document   4 
consumer segments that believe GM technologies represent high quality in the corn flakes cereals 
market.   
Individuals’ perceptions of the risk associated with particular products vary by product and can 
be greatly influenced by emotion and other subjective factors.  In fact, some researchers define risk 
perception as psychological interpretation of product properties (Rozin et al., 1986; Yeung and Morris, 
2001).  Hence, signals of food safety and other dimensions of quality, enter into the consumer’s decision 
calculus.  In the case of GM technology, food safety is likely to be more subjective because the safety of 
its adoption does not meet with uniform perception across all segments of consumers, i.e., GM 
ingredients may horizontally differentiate the product, finding favor with some consumers and disfavor 
with others.  This heterogeneity leads to a particularly interesting interaction with price, which is often 
used as a signal of quality.  For consumers with an initial view that GM food is safe or beneficial, a 
higher price may reinforce this initial view of high quality and reinforce decisions to purchase the 
product despite the higher price.  However, for consumers with an initial view of GM food as low 
quality, a low price may reinforce these low quality perceptions and nullify price discounts as a means 
of enticing product trial or expanding market share.  Hence, the monotonicity of the price-demand 
relationship may be challenged.  
This paper is concerned with the role of price as a quality signal in GM foods.  To explore the 
price-quality relationship, we analyze data collected from the administration of a mail-based survey that 
featured a conjoint (stated-preference) instrument in which a nationally representative cross-section of 
consumers chose among differentiated bread, corn and egg products.  Product attributes such as price, 
GM content level and negative and positive GM attributions for each product in a choice set were 
experimentally manipulated and randomly assigned across respondents.   5 
These data are used to test the hypothesis that GM product prices act as quality signal and the 
hypothesis that the effectiveness of price as a quality signal differs by the type of product.  The 
remaining structure of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the data and reports summary 
statistics.  Section 3 explains descriptive model which used for analysis.  Section 4 shows empirical 
results of the analysis and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. DATA  
The data were collected from a survey administered by the Department of Resource Economics 
and Policy at the University of Maine in 2002.  The mail survey was sent to 5,462 US residents 
nationally and 710 Maine residents.  Two thousand and twelve US (non-Maine) residents and 375 Maine 
residents returned surveys for a response rate of 37 percent and 53 percent, respectively.  Responses 
were weighted to account for the over-sampling of Maine residents.  The basic framework of the survey 
is as follows.  Three different products (bread, frozen corn, and eggs) were included and each product 
featured three options: the respondent’s normal brand, a brand with 100 percent GM content, and brand 
with no GM content.  Labels for the GM and non-GM product were presented and included information 
concerning relative price (cents more or less than normal brand), GM content, benefits or warnings 
associated with GM content, and the name of a firm or agency that certified the presence or absence of 
GM content.  No label was presented for the respondent’s normal brand; rather, the words ‘your normal 
brand’ were mentioned in a parallel fashion as a possible choice.   
Respondents were asked to assume that their normal brand was produced with a particular mix of 
both GM and Non-GM ingredients; the exact percent of ingredients that respondents were told to 
assume came from GM sources was randomly assigned across respondents.  Respondents were also told 
that all brands shared the same appearance, taste, texture, and smell.    6 
After viewing the product choices and being reminded of their household budget constraint, 
respondents chose the most preferred option.  Some respondents viewed one of the three product choice 
sets, some viewed two product choice sets and others viewed all three product choice sets with the 
number and order of viewing randomized across respondents.  Usable responses include 1,336, 793 and 
950 choices made for the bread, corn and eggs categories, respectively.  The prices used in the survey 
ranged from 40 cents more to 40 cents less than the cost of a package of the normal product.  
Earlier portions of the survey provide various characteristics concerning individual respondents 
including gender, age, education level, race, income level, household composition (including number 
and age of children) and attitudes and opinions toward GM technology (see Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics).  Indeed, it showed similar characteristics with U.S. census except the distribution of race and 
education level.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Socio-Demographics (N=1,967) 
  Summary statistics
 a  U.S. Census
 b 
  Average  %  Average  % 




Male    : 48.3 
Female: 51.7 
Age  52    47
    
No. of 
Children  0.6    0.9   
Household 
Income($)  63,000    57,000   
Education  15 
0-11 years           :  5.5 
12 years              :27.1 
1-3years college :28.5 
College graduate:22.5 






0-11 years           :19.6 
12 years              :28.6 
1-3years college :27.3 
College graduate:15.5 





White                                 : 90.0 
Black                                  :  4.6 
Hispanic or Spanish origin:   2.2 
Asian or Pacific Islander   :   1.9 






White                               :77.1
  
Black                               :12.9 
Asian or Pacific Islander :  4.5
c 
Others                              : 6.6
d 
(Hispanic
 or Latino          : 12.5 
 White                              : 69.1 
a The summary statistics are based on the modified data for the paper. The income data and education data were collected in 
ranges and midpoints of each range were used for the table. 
b  Source:
 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. 
c Asian or Pacific Islander includes Asian, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific islander. 
d Others include all other respondents not included in the categories of White, Black, and Asian or Pacific Islanders.  
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The survey also elicited respondents’ opinions toward GM technology.  Respondents were asked 
to rate their concern toward the use of GM technology in food production and processing by choosing a 
number from one to five with one implying “not at all concerned” and five implying “very concerned” 
(Table 2).  The average concern on the GM technology was 3.7.  More than half, but not all, of 
respondents rated their concern as ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ concerned. 
Table 2. Consumers’ concern on the GM technology (N=1,967) 
                    Concern 
Technology  1  2  3  4  5  Average 
Concern 
GM  5.2     9.8  23.2  23.5  38.3  3.7 
Growth Hormones  4.0     6.7  19.0  21.4  48.9  4.0 
Preservatives  8.5   16.6  31.0  19.9  24.0  3.3 
 
Respondents were also asked to rate their opinions on the importance of GM technology as a 
way to reduce consumers’ and producers’ costs and to rate the importance of GM technology as a way to 
deliver potential benefits to consumers and producers.  Each respondent rated the importance of 16 
potential benefits and 16 potential concerns related to GE foods on a five-point scale.  A factor analysis 
was then used to distill these responses into four primary underlying factors influencing their responses 
to these 32 questions.   
 
Table 3. Factor analysis results of respondents’ rating of the potential of benefit and cost-reduction 
produced by GM technology (N=1,967) 
  Consumers’ Benefits  Producers’ Benefits  Consumers’ Costs  Producers’ Cost 
Average  -0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.01 
Max  2.99  2.80  2.63  3.53 
Min  -3.87  -3.76  -4.57  -3.91 
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Table 3 lists descriptive statistics for these four factors, which feature a population average near 
zero by design.  This helps categorize each respondent’s attitudes toward GM technology as one that is 
positive or negative toward a view that the technology can help reduce costs for consumers and 
producers and bring benefits to producers and consumers.   
Respondents also estimated the proportion of GM ingredients that they thought currently existed 
in processed foods currently on the shelf in US supermarkets.  This number was later used to construct 
product-specific proxies for each respondent’s perception of the percent of GM ingredients in their 
normal brand of each of the three products.  Specifically, the respondent’s reported estimate of the 
percent of GM ingredients in all processed food was averaged with the percent of GM ingredients in 
each of the three products to construct a proxy of the respondent’s perception of the percent of GM 
ingredients in their normal brand of bread, corn and eggs (Table 4).  This procedure basically assumes a 
simple Bayesian updating scheme on the part of the consumer where equal weight is given to both 
pieces of information.  Other weighting schemes, including the sole use of only one piece of data, 
provided a poorer fit to the observed data, and are not considered.   
 
Table 4. Estimated proportion of GM ingredients in normal brand (N=1,967) 
  Bread  Corn  Eggs 
Average  42.5  42.0  41.5 
Max  90  90  90 
Min  2  1  1 
 
Several non-price product-specific attributes were also included on some product labels.  Some 
randomly assigned GM products included the following health (environmental) warning statement: 
“Long-term health (environmental) effects are currently unknown.”  Some randomly assigned GM 
products featured claims stating that the product was genetically modified to improve either a health   9 
attribute (increased levels of antioxidants for bread and corn and reduced levels of cholesterol for eggs) 
or an environmental attribute (reduced pesticide use for bread and corn).  All claims of GM content or 
absence were accompanied by a certifying statement endorsed by either a government agency, 
environmental organization, or an independent certification firm. 
Table 5 summarizes the product choices made by respondents. About half of the respondents 
chose the Non-GM brand in each product category while about 20 percent chose the GM brand. 
Table 5. Preferred product in choice set 
  Bread  Corn  Eggs 


























3.  MODEL 
To estimate the factors that drive respondents’ choices of GM versus non-GM products, a 
binomial logit model of the form  
), ' (
1











= C =                                           (1) 
is employed, where Y is a binary categorical variable and where  1 = Y  when respondent chooses the 
GM brand and Y = 0 otherwise.  Vector  X  contains the set of known factors that drive respondents’ 
decisions, b  is a conformable vector of parameters and,  ) (× L  is the logistic cumulative distribution 
function.  The parameters, which are estimated via the maximum likelihood method, dictate the 
probability of choosing the GM brand over alternative brands for the set of characteristic X .  The    10 
Table 6. Description of Variables for Logit model of GM brand choice 
Variable Name  Description     
Dependent Variable:  (i=B, C, and E; B=Bread, C=Corn, E=Eggs)   
Choice_B, Choice_C, Choice_E  1 if respondents choose GM brand for product i   
  0 if respondents choose other brands for product i   
Independent Variable:     
DPi  
The price of the normal brand less the price of the GM brand in cents for product 
category i, where i Î[B, C, E] for bread, corn and eggs, respectively. 
Di, k,                                
Dk = 1 if the price of the normal brand in category i less the price of the GM brand 
in cents is in the range of [k, k + 5] for k = -40, -30, -20, -10, 5, 15, 25, 35; = 0 
otherwise.  
DPi_SQ                       (DPi + 40)
2   
DPi_TR  (DPi + 40)
3   
DPNGMi  
The price of the normal brand less the price of the non-GM brand in cents for 
product category i, where i Î[B, C, E] for bread, corn and eggs, respectively 
GOV  = 1 if certifying agency was a government agency   
  = 0 otherwise     
ENV  = 1 if certifying agency was an environmental agency   
  = 0 otherwise     
IND  = 1 if certifying agency was an independent certifier   
  = 0 otherwise     
BANTIA, CANTIA 
 
= 1 if GM bread (BANTIA) and GM corn (CANTIA) claims to be more healthful 
due to heightened levels of antioxidants 
  = 0 otherwise     
BLTHA, CLTHA, ELTHA 
 
= 1 if GM bread (BLTHA), GM corn (CLTHA), and GM eggs (ELTHA) have a 
health warning label 
  0 otherwise     
BLTEA, CLTEA, ELTEA  = 1 if GM bread (BLTEA), GM corn (CLTEA), and GM eggs (ELTEA) have an 
environmental warning label 
  = 0 otherwise     
LBPREDA   ln(% reduction in pesticides used in growing wheat for GM bread + 1) 
LCPREDA  ln(% reduction in pesticides used in growing GM corn + 1) 
LEPREDA  ln(% reduction in cholesterol due to use of GM eggs + 1)   
GMCONCERN  = 1 if respondent rated GM technology a ‘5’ on a 5-point scale of concern,  
  = 0 otherwise     
OWNBEN  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s benefits for consumers 
PRODBEN  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s benefits for producers 
OWNCOST  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s cost reductions for consumers 
PRODCOST  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s cost reductions for producers 
BREADGM  Respondent’s estimate of % of normal bread made from GM wheat 
CORNGM  Respondent’s estimate of % of normal corn made from GM corn 
EGGSGM  Respondent’s estimate of % of normal eggs made from GM eggs 
MALE  = 1 if male, = 0 if female   
RACE  = 1 if White, = 0 otherwise   
AGE_30  = 1 if under 30 years old, = 0 otherwise   
AGE_70  = 1  if over 70 years old, = 0 otherwise   
ED16  = 1 if obtained a Bachelor’s degree or more, = 0 otherwise 
INC_L  = 1 if annual household income ￿ $5,000, = 0 otherwise 
INC_H  = 1 if annual household income ￿ $95,000, = 0 otherwise 
CHILD  = 1 if children present in household, = 0 otherwise 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics for Variables of Logit model of GM brand choice 
Variable Name  Average  Share (%)  MIN  MAX 
Choice_B     18.0       
Choice_C    21.0     
Choice_E    17.0     
GOV    77.1     
ENV     4.8       
IND     7.1       
BANTIA      8.6       
CANTIA      7.2       
BLTHA        34.0       
CLTHA      33.8       
ELTHA      32.8       
BLTEA      33.4       
CLTEA      30.8       
ELTEA      34.4       
LBPREDA  2.01     0  4.62 
LCPREDA  1.99     0  4.62 
LEPREDA  2.14     0  4.62 
GMCONCERN    37.7       
OWNBEN  -0.02     -3.87  2.99 
PRODBEN  0.01     -3.76  2.80 
OWNCOST  0.02     -4.57  2.63 
PRODCOST  -0.01     -3.91  3.53 
BREADGM  42.50     2  90 
CORNGM  42.00     1  90 
EGGSGM  41.50     1  90 
MALE     45       
RACE      90       
AGE_30     9.8   18  29  
AGE_70     17.5   70  93  
ED16     22.1       
INC_L      4.2       
INC_H      16.3     
CHILD      32.5       
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individual-specific data and product-specific variables included in the vector X are detailed in Table 6.  
Note that several approaches are used to capture relative prices.  Summary statistics for each variable is 
presented in Table 7. 
 
4. RESULTS 
Visual Inspection of Share Data by Relative Price  
As an initial investigation of the price-quality relationship, the percent of respondents who 
choose the GM brand in each product category (also referred to as GM market share) is plotted for each 
price level used in the survey design (Figure 1a, 1b, 1c).  Because the other attributes of GM brand (e.g., 
health claims) are randomly assigned across respondents in a fashion that is not correlated with the 
relative price that is assigned, the average profile of the GM products for each relative price level should 
be similar, meaning one can draw intuition from these simple plots.   
The graphs show a non-monotonic pattern between price and respondents’ choices for all 
products.  That is, the market share for the GM good among our respondents is not monotonically 
decreasing in price, and this motivates our inquiry of price as a quality signal for the GM technology.  
Also, the graphs show that the deviation from the normal monotonic patterns differs across 
products.  For example, the graph for GM bread shows that market share decreases as price increases at 
higher price levels.  This is similar to the standard theory in which demand decreases as price increases.  
However, market share increases as relative price increases for price levels below that of their normal 
brand.  This might indicate that consumers interpret prices below a certain threshold as a negative signal 
of quality for GM bread (the “something must be wrong with it” heuristic) and choose other options.  
This pattern contradicts theoretical results forwarded by Jones and Hudson (1996) who suggested that 
only prices above a critical price threshold are used for signaling quality (the “if its this expensive, it   13 
must be good” heuristic).  A similar pattern is observed in the case of GM corn.  In the case of GM corn 
the graph shows that consumers react to a possible quality signal not only at lower price levels but also 
at the highest price levels.  Market share more strictly adheres to a monotonically decreasing function of 
price in the case of GM eggs.  Although there are some indications that prices act as quality signals at 
extreme levels of price, the visual evidence from the graphs is less convincing. 
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Econometric analysis 
To formally test the trends that appear in the simple graphical exploration of market shares by 
price, a binomial logit model is estimated for each GM product of the following form:.  
￿ e + b + a + a = =
n
i GM i i X p F Y 1 0 ' ) ( *                                 (2) 
where 
* Y  is a latent preference index that, when it is greater than zero, triggers purchase of the GM 
product (i.e., causes, Y, the observed variable, to equal one if the GM product is purchased and equal 
zero otherwise); a0 is an intercept parameter; Fi(·) is the ith function of the relative price of the GM 
brand (pGM); ai is the ith parameter associated with the ith function of price; X is a vector of all 
independent variables except GM brand prices; b  is a conformable vector of parameters; ande  is the 
error term.  Two general forms of the Fi(·) functions were articulated in Table 6: one where dummy 
variables are created to represent eight different price categories and one where a polynomial in the price 
of the GM food is created.  The polynomial representation is Fj = (DP + 40)
j, where 40 is added to all 
relative prices of GM products, i.e., all prices are normalized to the lowest possible price offered, to 
avoid squaring a negative number.   
The estimation results for each product are in Tables 8-10.  To test the hypothesis that the market 
share of GM products is monotonic in price, the following hypotheses are formulated when price is 
represented by categorical dummy-variables:  
H0:  ai > ai+1   H1: ai 
￿
 ai+1        7 , , 1￿ = i                              (3) 
H0:  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a a a a a a a a = = = = = = =                            (4) 
H1:  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a a a a a a a a ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹             
H0:  4 3 2 1 a a a a = = =                                                             (5) 
H1:  4 3 2 1 a a a a ¹ ¹ ¹   
H0:  8 7 6 5 a a a a = = =                                                             (6) 
H1:  8 7 6 5 a a a a ¹ ¹ ¹             
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Table 8. Regression results for Bread (binary logit) (N=1,336) 
Polynomial Approach  Dummy Variable Approach  Explanatory Variable 
Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio
 a  Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio
 a 
Dependent Variable: Choice_B 
INTERCEPT  -2.61  -6.82***  -  - 
DPB  -0.02  -5.22***  -  - 
DB,-40  -  -  -2.14  -5.22*** 
DB,,-30  -  -  -1.97  -4.79*** 
DB, -20  -  -  -2.37  -5.40*** 
DB, -10  -  -  -2.34  -5.58*** 
DB, 5  -  -  -2.89  -6.51*** 
DB, 15  -  -  -2.93  -6.42*** 
DB, 25  -  -  -3.09  -6.70*** 
DB, 35  -  -  -3.16  -6.85*** 
DPNGMB  0.01   1.90*  0.01   1.90* 
GOV  0.44    1.65*  0.44   1.64 
ENV  -0.37  -0.71  -0.33  -0.64 
IND  -0.09  -0.23  -0.09  -0.21 
BANTIA  1.06   3.81***  1.02   3.63*** 
BLTHA  -0.58  -3.07***  -0.57  -3.02*** 
BLTEA  -0.30  -1.64  -0.29  -1.61 
LBPREDA  0.29    6.68***  0.30   6.64*** 
GMCONCERN  -0.60  -3.41***  -0.61  -3.45*** 
OWNBEN  -3.10E-03  -0.05  -0.01  -0.16 
PRODBEN  3.47E-03   0.06  0.01   0.16 
OWNCOST  -0.16  -2.54**  -0.16  -2.58*** 
PRODCOST  0.16   2.53**  0.16   2.57** 
BREADGM  0.01   1.60  0.01   1.54 
MALE  -0.03  -0.21  -0.04  -0.28 
RACE  1.53E-03   1.52  1.61E-03   1.60 
AGE_30  -0.82  -2.21**  -0.83  -2.26** 
AGE_70  0.23   1.17  0.22   1.10 
ED16  0.46   2.53**  0.46   2.53** 
INC_L  -0.01  -0.05  -0.02  -0.11 
INC_H  0.01   0.05  0.02   0.11 
CHILD  -1.56E-03  -2.00**  -1.65E-03  -2.12** 
a *, **, ***: significant at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 9. Regression results Corn (binary logit) (N=793) 
Polynomial Approach  Dummy Variable Approach  Explanatory Variable 
Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio
 a  Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio
 a 
Dependent Variable: Choice_C 
INTERCEPT  -1.82  -3.55***  -  - 
DPC  0.05   1.64  -  - 
DPC_SQ  -1.89E-03  -2.00**  -  - 
DPC_TR  1.53E-05   1.95*  -  - 
DC,-40  -  -  -1.66  -3.46*** 
DC,-30  -  -  -1.43  -3.01*** 
DC, -20  -  -  -1.48  -2.93*** 
DC, -10  -  -  -1.41  -2.91*** 
DC, 5  -  -  -1.94  -3.76*** 
DC, 15  -  -  -2.17  -4.30*** 
DC, 25  -  -  -2.17  -4.00*** 
DC, 35  -  -  -1.94  -4.03*** 
DPNGMC  1.76E-03   0.48  1.87E-03    0.51 
GOV  0.11   0.36  0.10    0.34 
ENV  -0.22  -0.39  -0.26  -0.47 
IND  -1.40  -2.09**  -1.45  -2.15** 
CANTIA  0.59   1.65*  0.58   1.62 
CLTHA  -0.66  -2.85***  -0.67  -2.85*** 
CLTEA  -0.26  -1.21  -0.26  -1.20 
LCPREDA  0.24   4.81***  0.24   4.86*** 
GMCONCERN  -0.45  -2.08**  -0.45  -2.06** 
OWNBEN  0.11   1.55  0.12   1.62 
PRODBEN  -0.11  -1.55  -0.12  -1.62 
OWNCOST  -0.14  -1.93*  -0.14  -1.88* 
PRODCOST  0.14   1.93*  0.14   1.87* 
CORNGM  -1.19E-03  -0.22  -8.68E-04  -0.16 
MALE  0.28   1.44  0.29   1.50 
RACE  -2.48E-05  -0.02  -6.94E-05  -0.06 
AGE_30  0.04   0.10  0.03   0.07 
AGE_70  0.31   1.22  0.30   1.18 
ED16  0.33   1.53  0.32   1.50 
INC_L  0.26   1.15  0.26   1.12 
INC_H  -0.26  -1.16  -0.26  -1.12 
CHILD  9.98E-04   0.66  1.02E-03   0.68 
a *, **, ***: significant at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 10. Regression results for Eggs (binary logit) (N=950) 
  Polynomial Approach  Dummy Variable Approach 
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio
 a  Estimated Coefficient  t-ratio
 a 
Dependent Variable: Choice_E 
INTERCEPT  -2.11  -4.68***  -  - 
DPE  -0.01  -2.98***  -  - 
DE,-40  -  -  -1.78  -3.60*** 
DE,-30  -  -  -1.82  -3.64*** 
DE, -20  -  -  -1.70  -3.27*** 
DE, -10  -  -  -2.18  -4.30*** 
DE, 5  -  -  -1.92  -3.80*** 
DE, 15  -  -  -2.32  -4.45*** 
DE, 25  -  -  -2.62  -4.81*** 
DE, 35  -  -  -2.47  -4.64*** 
DPNGME  0.01   2.91***  0.01   2.88*** 
GOV  0.45   1.32  0.46   1.34 
ENV  0.06   0.11  0.07   0.12 
IND  -0.23  -0.42  -0.23  -0.42 
ELTHA  -0.21  -0.96  -0.21  -0.96 
ELTEA  -0.42  -1.86*  -0.42  -1.87* 
LEPREDA  0.20   4.35***  0.20   4.31*** 
GMCONCERN  -0.56  -2.80***  -0.56  -2.80*** 
OWNBEN  0.14   1.98**  0.13   1.89* 
PRODBEN  -0.14  -1.98**  -0.13  -1.89* 
OWNCOST  -0.15  -2.15**  -0.15  -2.15** 
PRODCOST  0.15   2.15**  0.15   2.15** 
EGGSGM  0.01   0.94  4.16E-03   0.83 
MALE  -0.02  -0.08  -0.02  -0.10 
RACE  8.02E-05   0.10  -4.93E-06  -0.01 
AGE_30  -0.41  -1.20  -0.38  -1.10 
AGE_70  -0.34  -1.29  -0.34  -1.27 
ED16  0.01   0.06  0.02   0.11 
INC_L  0.19   0.79  0.19   0.81 
INC_H  -0.19  -0.79  -0.19  -0.81 
CHILD  -1.69E-04  -0.20  -7.30E-05  -0.08 
a *, **, ***: significant at the ten, five, and one percent level, respectively. 
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Table 11. Likelihood Ratio Test Results 
 
*,** signifies the hypothesis is rejected at the ten and five percent level, respectively. 
 
 
The first hypothesis (3) postulates seven separate inequalities where the parameter for each lower 
price category is strictly larger (i.e., more likely to induce the choice of the GM product) than the 
parameter for the higher, adjacent price category.  Rejection of this hypothesis means that strict 
monotonicity of market share does not hold for a particular adjacent pair of price categories.  The second 
hypothesis (4) flips the approach by postulating that all price parameters are equal; rejection merely 
confirms all price points do not have the same effect on market share.  Hypotheses (5) and (6) are 
limited versions of (4) and test for insensitivity to price across all price points lower than the 
respondent’s normal brand (a1 - a4) and all higher price points higher than the respondent’s normal 
brand (a5 - a8).  Hypothesis testing results for each product category are listed in Table 11.   
The null hypothesis in (3), i.e., monotonicity, is rejected at the ten percent significance level for 
all adjacent price points of all products except for  4 = i  in the bread category, which means that 
monotonicity between the price categories of [-$0.10, -$0.05] and [$0.05, $0.10] cannot be rejected.  For 
Hypothesis  i  Bread  Corn  Eggs  Critical Values 
1  0.39  0.45  0.02 
2  2.16  0.02  0.14 
3  0.01  0.04  1.87 
4  3.36*  2.08  0.54 
5  0.02  0.31  1.23 
6  0.18  4.40E-05  0.57 
(3) H0:   1 + a > a i i   H1:  1 + a £ a i i         7 , , 1￿ = i  
7  0.43  0.32  0.12 
3.84(5%) 
2.71(10%) 
(4) H0:  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a a a a a a a a = = = = = = =  
      H1:  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 a a a a a a a a ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹          
31.76**  9.94  11.39  [1.69, 16.01](5%) 
[2.17, 14.06](10%) 
(5) H0:   4 3 2 1 a a a a = = =    
      H1:  4 3 2 1 a a a a ¹ ¹ ¹  
  2.97  0.65  2.42  [0.22, 9.35](5%) 
[0.35, 7.81](10%) 
(6) H0:   8 7 6 5 a a a a = = =                                                              
      H1:  8 7 6 5 a a a a ¹ ¹ ¹             
  0.81  0.64  3.44  [0.22, 9.35](5%) 
[0.35, 7.81](10%)   20 
all other adjacent price points and all products, cheaper GM products are not significantly more likely to 
be chosen than ones slightly more expensive.   
The null hypothesis of (4), i.e., equivalence of the effect of all price categories on purchase 
decisions, is rejected at the ten percent significance level only in bread category.  It suggests that there is 
significant sensitivity of choice to price in the bread category but not much price sensitivity in the corn 
and egg categories.  The null hypotheses of (5) and (6) refine the results by validating that, across all 
relative prices that share the same sign, there is no significant difference in market share’s response 
across price categories.  Taken together the test results suggest that a monotonic relationship is not 
present for most products and, for the one category in which some monotonicity exists, it is only 
significant when crossing the threshold from prices that are greater than the normal brand’s reference 
price to prices that are less than the reference price. 
Despite category-by-category monotonicity of market share in price, a simpler regression 
featuring choice as a linear function of price may reveal the expected negative relationship.  Therefore, a 
second approach to examining monotonicity is used to test for non-monotonicity: we test for the 
significance of higher-order terms in polynomial representations of GM price.  For the model of GM 
bread and GM egg choices, however, only the linear relative price variables (DPB and DPE) were 
significant; results featuring higher order terms are omitted.  DPB and DPE affected consumer choices of 
GM bread and eggs in negative manner, which is consistent with standard theory and suggests that the 
role of price in signaling quality is not strong enough to cause a non-monotonic relationship between 
price and market share.  
For the model of the GM frozen corn choice, the square and cube of the relative price of GM 
corn are also significant (DPC_SQ and DPC_TR, respectively).  This suggests the possibility of a 
significant, non-monotonic change in the consumption pattern as price changes.  At lower prices, the   21 
probability of choosing the GM corn decreases even if price is lowered further.  However, the 
probability of choosing GM corn increases at higher prices when price is raised further.  This retains the 
basic shape observed from the raw data plot in figure 1b.  The ability of such a cubic relationship to hold 
beyond the narrow price range explored is, of course, highly questionable.  Minimally as price continues 
toward zero market share can go no lower than zero, while, at very high prices, market share will suffer.  
 
Discussion 
  Taking the results from the dummy variable approach and polynomial approach together, there 
appears to be some evidence that demand for the GM products in non-monotonic in price.  The most 
convincing evidence exists for GM corn: both the dummy variable and polynomial approaches reject 
monotonicity.    The  weakest  case  exists  for  GM  bread:  the  dummy  variable  approach  suggests 
monotonicity for price categories surrounding the reference price of the respondent’s normal brand and 
no higher-order terms are significant in the polynomial approach.  An intermediate case exists for GM 
eggs: the dummy variable approach finds no case for monotonicity while the polynomial case finds no 
significance for higher-order terms. 
  While there is some evidence against monotonity of demand in price, one may argue that factors 
other than price-quality signals drive this lack of monotonicity.  One argument could be that respondents 
faced hypothetical choices and, hence, did not seriously weigh price when contemplating GM product 
choice.  Indeed, such critiques of hypothetical questionnaires are common in the literature.  If this were 
the  case  we  would  also  expect  the  price  of  non-GM  products,  which  are  presented  to  the  same 
respondents in the same manner, to be ignored in respondents’ decisions.  However, in two of the three 
models,  the  price  of  the  non-GM  product  appears  as  a  significant  influence  on  the  decision  of  the 
respondent, suggesting that prices were impacting respondent decisions in a traditional way for non-GM   22 
goods.  The category in which the non-GM price was insignificant was corn, which is also the category 
for which the case on non-monotonicity of GM demand in price was the strongest.  All tolled this leaves 
a mixed though intriguing case for the possibility that respondents were using price as a signal of quality 




The purpose of this paper is to analyze how prices of GM products may act as quality signals and 
affect consumers’ purchase decisions.  Three products (GM bread, corn, and eggs) are analyzed using 
conjoint data generated from a nationally representative mail survey.  Plots of the raw relationship 
between price and the share of consumers choosing GM products in each category hint at a non-
monotonic relationship between price and market share and an estimated binary logit model of choices 
supports the lack of monotonicty in two of the three product categories.  
The plots of GM bread and GM corn suggest that consumers may use price as a signal of product 
quality when price deviates enough from the normal brand’s price.  Consumers’ purchase intentions for 
GM bread increased as price declined modestly below the reference price down to a critical price level; 
after this price threshold, lowering prices had no real traction in increasing market share in GM bread.  
The plot of GM eggs showed no significant difference from general economic theory. That is, the price-
demand relationship was monotonic over the whole price range.  Hence, there was no obvious indication 
of the existence of price signaling quality.   
Logit models of the respondent choice of the GM product as a function of price and other factors 
are used to formally test for non-monotonicity of demand in price.  The strongest case for non-
monotonicity in price appears for the GM corn product, while the weakest case exists for the GM bread.  
The logical link between non-monotonicity of demand for GM products in price and respondents’ use of   23 
GM product price as a signal of quality requires evidence that respondents properly weighed price data 
during the decision making process.  Mixed evidence is found, with prices for the non-GM product 
being significant and of the expected sign in two of the three categories.  In summary, the evidence is 
suggestive that respondents use the price of GM products as a signal of quality.  Further survey work 
would need to be conducted where respondents are specifically asked to rate perceived product quality 
after viewing price and non-price information for GM and non-GM products. 
Food products with labeled GM ingredients are in an introduction (start-up) period of their life 
cycle in most product categories.  Firms who try to gain public awareness for their products and to 
expand their market share might, for example, have to decide between a low introductory pricing 
strategy, a price matching strategy, or strategy that sets price higher than competing, non-GM brands.  If 
consumers use price as a signal of quality, however, some of these pricing strategies might less effective 
or disastrous in certain product categories.  For the hypothetical GM corn product in our research, for 
example, firms pursuing a low-introductory price strategy may fight an uphill battle because respondents 
may interpret low prices as a negative quality signal and avoid the trial purchases necessary to spur 
current and future sales.   
Considering the consumption patterns of GM products are distinctively different between certain 
consumption groups, choosing a marketing strategy will not be a simple matter.  In fact, applying a 
pricing strategy alone as a marketing strategy without considering consumers’ characteristics might not 
be effective for expanding market share of GM products.  Differentiated pricing strategies along with 
suitable non-pricing strategies (e.g., labeling) in connection with different marketing target would be 
desirable for firm.  
There is some evidence that price acts as a quality signal and affects consumers’ purchase 
decisions for some GM products along with other signals such as quality or safety related labeling.    24 
Price signals alone often mislead consumers into thinking that the product is distinctly differentiated and 
has better quality compared to other products even if it is not entirely the case.  On the contrary, 
consumers could interpret price signals that the product has lower quality than other products.  Non-
pricing strategies such as a labeling either help consumers to form proper ideas on GM products or 
mislead them more.  There is asymmetric information between consumers and other parties such as 
government and producers (sellers) in GM product market.  Consumers who differentiate between GM 
products and Non GM products in market generally do not have sufficient information to do.  Hence, a 
pricing strategy without proper product regulation would have great profit incentives for a firm whose 
product price contains positive quality signals.  Under the presence of quality signals by price, product 
standard regulation and labeling standard regulation of quality and safety are important to reduce the 
excessive incentives of sellers to exploit any information asymmetries.   
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